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As human being is an intelligent and knowledge able creature, he has tried to name the events and 
phenomenons and labeled them as bad or good during the process of his existence. There have been 
different views about the source of good and bad which are within the life and observation field of 
humanbeing. When considering the absolute goodness of Godinteism which views God as the 
creator of every thing and almighty, there exists a conflict about the source of badness. Within our 
study, we have handled and evaluated the matter of badness- a very significant problem in the 
history of thought- from two different perspectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In the last hundred years, eighty-four thousand people died in 
the earthquake that took place on 28 December, 1908 in 
Messina, Sicily; thirty thousand people died in Avezzano 
earthquake, on September 30, 1915; a hundred thousand people 
died in Chinese earthquake on December 16, 1920; one 
hundred and fifty thousand people died in Tokyo and 
Yokohama earthquake on 1 September, 1923; two hundred and 
fifty thousand people died in Indonesia's earthquake and 
tsunami on 26 December, 2004; approximately 40-50 million 
people died in the second world war, which lasted from 1939 to 
1945, and in our country approximately thirty three thousand 
people died in the Erzincan Earthquake on 26-27 December, 
1939; and in the earthquake on August 17, 1999, approximately 
fifty thousand people died according to unofficial figures. As 
Poidevin said, world history is filled with the most horrific 
anguish of sorrow that comes to mind as a result of natural 
disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, disease and 
hunger, or human actions such as wars, environmental 
devastation and religious persecution. If we believe in a divine 
being that is capable of everything, knows everything, and is 
just good at absolute goodness, there is no doubt a situation we 
have to answer. If He knows everything, He will be aware of 
the suffering, and in addition, if He is a power-worthy 
existence, He will try to prevent pain and suffering by being 
able to do everything as required by his perfect good. However, 
it is seen clearly that God does not prevent pain; therefore, 
whether there is no such entity; or even if there is, it can 
happen if he desires, or he is not the one who knows 
everything, who is powerful in everything, and is not perfectly 
good (Poidevin, 2003, 138-139). 
 
As it is known, whether it is theological or philosophical, the 
understanding of the God in the theology leads us to the 
existence of a heavenly entity that knows everything, is 
ultimately powerless, eternal, unlimited, good. So, everything, 
the good, the bad, goodness-malice that exists in the universe is 
known by God and everything is created by him. In this case, 
while it is possible to understand and give meaning to the good, 
beautiful and pleasant that happens in the universe, problems 
arise about the place and meaning of the bad things that we 
experience in various forms. Indeed, it is a fact that there are 
facts and events that are the source of suffering and trouble on 
earth, and that mankind consider them as evil. It is seen that 
these phenomena and events, which are understood as evil, 
somehow touch us all. As well as goodness and beauty, evil 
and ugliness come somehow into every person's direct or 
indirect observation life (Yaran, 1998; 79). So, the 
phenomenon of evil has occupied almost every time not only 
philosophers and God's scientists, but also everybody who 
thinks about the nature of existence, the world and where the 
human being came from and how it is determined (Werner, 
2000; s. 7) As it is known, according to the theology; 
 
1. God is almighty. 
2. God knows everything. 
3. God is absolute good. 
4. There is still evil (Plantinga, 1967;  11). 
 
Now, when the evils expressed in this group of proposals are 
considered in the natural point of view and everything falls into 
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its place in the actual cause and effect chain, there are some 
difficulties in explaining this situation when viewed from the 
point of divine justice. Because if God knows everything, he 
will prevent evil which causes this pain. Moreover, at the same 
time, an entirely good being must prevent evil as by force good 
(İmamoğlu, 2004; 203; Işıklar, 1994; 203). These thoughts, 
which would then form the basis of the problem of evil were 
first handled by Epicurus as a philosophical problem and they 
were later created by Lactantius and the classic version of 
Leibniz as it is today. The main bearing of the problem is: 
 
Does not God have the power to prevent evil even he wants to? 
Then He is weak.  
 
He is powerful enough but does not want to prevent it?  
If he is not well-intentioned and powerful enough, then why is 
there so much evil (Hume, 1979; 198; Hick, 1985; 5; Ward, 
1982; 189)? 
 
Every philosopher considered and evaluated this subject in the 
basis of his own thought and belief system. Some have tried to 
solve the problem by interpreting it in various forms, such as 
the absence of a positive reality of evil, the absence of 
goodness, everything that exists as a result of God's power and 
well-being (Augustine, 1949; 159; Hick, 1983;  43), that evil is 
a tool for the human being to mature (Hick, 2013; 423-435; 
Seneca, 1997; 33), on the basis of the principle that there is 
something for something with the ontological connection 
between good and evil, that there will be no good if it is not 
evil, that if there was not evil, the good wouldn't be appreciated 
(Eflatun, 1990; 33), the existing evils are relatively less than 
the good ones, the good things dominate the evils, so that the 
present world is the best of the possible worlds(Leibniz, 1985; 
130-132; 1960;  410). On the other hand, many think since the 
time of Epicurus that the existence of evil poses a problem for 
those who embrace a Godly belief in the theological sense, 
because on one hand there is a being that is all-powerful and 
absolutely good and on the other hand the existence of evil 
cannot coexist with the good and thus those who have Godly 
belief either deny that God has one of all-powerful and 
absolutely good qualities- that is, these qualities are the 
essential qualities of God in theism-or they need to accept that 
their religious beliefs lack rational support. For example, 
McCloskey says: 
 
“Evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is 
involved in the fact of evil on the one hand, and the belief in 
the omnipotence and perfection of God on the other. (Closkey, 
1960; 97). 
 
Again, Mackie:  
“…And he can still retain all that assential to his position, by 
holding that God's existence is known in some other, non-
rational way. I think, however, that a more telling criticism can 
be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can 
be shown, not that religious belief slack rational support, but 
that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of the 
essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another, 
so that the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only 
by a much more extreme rejection of reason than in the former 
case” (Mackie, 1955; 200) 
 
Therefore, there are basically two different approaches to the 
problem of evil in the history of thought. The first is a 
theological approach that attempts to prove that theism may 
actually be right and reasonable against evil that there is no 
contradiction between the basic propositions that a God who 
knows everything, who is powerful in all things, and is 
absolutely good, and the evils which are present in the universe 
or on which the problem of evil is based, even if there is, the 
contradiction is not as powerful as the atheists claim, there is a 
reason for the God to allow the evil, And the second is the 
atheistic approach that attempts to prove that there is a 
contradiction, which cannot be removed, between the 
propositions on which the problem is based and even if it is not 
so, the existence of evil makes the belief in God unlikely 
(Akdemir, 2007; 165-166). In our work, we will consider and 
evaluate Mackie's views as a representative of the theoretical 
perspective and Alvin Plantinga's views as the representative of 
the atheism, which represents two different approaches to the 
problem of evil. 
 
Two Different Views on the Problem of Evil: Theist and 
Atheist Approach 
 
As it is known, the atheistic approach to the problem of evil is 
based on the qualities which is attributed to the understanding 
of God by theism. Because according to theism, 
 
1. God is almighty. 
2. God is absolute good.  
3. There are evils. 
 
According to Mackie, theism is fundamentally incoherent when 
we consider the above propositions. It is therefore not rational. 
Because the evil that exists in the world does not correspond 
with the understanding of God, who is capable of everything, 
knows everything, and is absolutely good. It is a contradictory 
situation to think that a God who is all-powerful cannot create a 
universe without moral evil. The religious understanding of 
theism does not only lose its rational support through the 
problem of evil, at the same time, it can also be made clear that 
it is irrational. The most fundamental contradiction of the 
problem is that God is almighty, is absolutely good and evil 
exists. Because, if any two of these proposals are correct, the 
third proposition will be definitely wrong. At the same time, 
however, these three propositions are fundamental propositions 
of many theological approaches. The theists have to theorize 
these three propositions. But it seems that they cannot do it 
successfully (Mackie, 1955; 201; Peterson, 2013; 288) 
 
According to Plantinga, it is necessary to look at the 
inconsistency and the strain that Mackie posed here. According 
to him, there are various kinds of contradictory propositions. 
The first is a clear contradictory proposition. If a proposition is 
a compound proposition which requires the denial or rejection 
of the other proposition, it is called a contradictory proposition. 
Suh as; 
 
 Paul is a good tennis player, 
and, 
 It is wrong that Paul is a good tennis player. 
(Plantinga, 2002; 12) 
 
Just like propositions above, if a proposition clearly denies or 
rejects the other one, these propositions are contradictory 
propositions. The second set of inconsistent propositions is a 
set of formally contradictory propositions and a clear 
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inconsistency can be understood with the rules of logic from 
the set of propositions. For example; 
 
1. If all people are mortal, then Socrates is also mortal. 
2. All people are mortal. 
3. Socrates is not mortal (Plantinga, 2002; 13-14). the set 
of propositions are clearly not contradictory. 
 
What is important here is to be able to make explicit 
contradictions from these proposals using normal logic rules. 
According to Plantinga, for this reason we must derive a new 
proposition from the group of proposals which is clearly 
contradictory when added to the group. We can apply this with 
the rule of the logic: if p has occurred, then q has occurred; 
phas occurred and so has q occurred. So, we can make the 
contradiction from the propositions (1), (2) and (3) that (4) 
Socrates is mortal. On doing so, as the proposition that (3) 
Socrates is not mortal among the (1),(2),(3) and(4) propositions 
is the denial and rejection of the proposal that (4) Socrates is 
mortal, these propositions are the set of contradictory 
propositions (Plantinga, 2002;  14). 
 
The third inconsistent proposition group, according to 
Plantinga, is an implicit contradictory proposition. 
Accordingly, if we add a mandatory proposition to another set 
of propositions, then the set of propositions becomes a formally 
contradictory proposition, in this case the set of propositions 
becomes an implicit contradictory proposition. For example;  
 
1. Ali is older than Mehmet. 
2. Mehmet is older than Ayşe. 
3. Ali is not older than Ayşe. 
 
Let’s consider the propositions above. According to him, such 
set of propositions neither formally nor clearly contradictory 
propositions. We cannot deduce the rejection of one 
proposition from the other propositions by moving from logic 
rules. But common sense and intelligence say that these sets of 
propositions are contradictory. Because it is not possible that 
these three proposals are correct at the same time. Then,  
 
The proposition “If Ali is older than Mehmet and Mehmet is 
older than Ayşe, then Ali is older than Ayşe” is mandatorily 
correct.  
 
If we add the proposition (8) to the above propositions group, 
the propositions 5, 6, 8 require the rejection of the proposition 
(7) with the reason for the normal logic rules (Plantinga, 2002; 
s. 16) 
 
After expressing on what conditions the set of contradictory 
propositions is inconsistent, Plantinga deals with the 
inconsistencies separately suggested by Mackie among the 
propositions "God is almighty, God is absolute good and there 
are evil." Because none of the propositions in this set of 
propositions deny or reject other propositions. Therefore, there 
is no clear contradiction between the proposals ‘God is 
almighty, God is absolute good and there are evil.’ If we take 
into account the inconsistency between Mackie's proposals 
with reference to the definition of the second contradictory 
proposition, as a formally contradictory set is a  set which can 
make a clear contradiction from the propositions of the set with 
the rules of logic, there is also no formal contradiction between 
these propositions that Mackie suggests which are 
inconsistency and contradiction (Plantinga, 2002; 13-14) If we 
consider the third contradictory proposition, that is, the 
definition of the implicit contradictory proposition, The 
inconsistency may be such a contradiction between the 
proposals ‘God is almighty, God is absolute good and there are 
evil’ suggested by Mackie according to Plantinga. Mackie 
already argues that there is a contradiction between the 
propositions that form the basis of theism and he is aware that 
such objection suggested by Plantinga may arise. That is why 
he clearly states that the contradiction and inconsistency that he 
claims to exist between these proposals will not occur 
immediately. 
 
“Now once the problem is fully stated it is clear that it can be 
solved, in the sense that the problem will not arise if one gives 
up at least one of the propositions that constitute it. If you are 
prepared to say that God is not wholly good, or not quite 
omnipotent,or that evil does not exist, or that good is not 
opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are limits to 
what an omnipotent thing can do, then the problem of evil will 
not arise for you”( Mackie, 1955; 201) 
 
So, Mackie adds two additional propositions to his set of 
propositions in order to reveal the contradiction he claims to 
exist among these propositions, which are basic doctrines of 
theism. In this case, the set of propositions which he claims to 
have contradictions and inconsistencies is as follows: 
 
1. God is almighty. 
2. God is absolute good. 
3. There are evil. 
4. A good entity is enough to remove the evil. 
5. There is no limit in what an Omnipotent entity who is 
almighty can do (Mackie, 1955; 201). 
 
According to Plantinga, if Mackie wants to show that there is a 
hidden contradiction between these proposals, he should also 
show that these two propositions he adds are not only true but 
also essential. However, even though the proposition (13), that 
is, there is no limit in what an Omnipotent entity who is 
almighty can do possible that the thought may be correct, it is 
not necessarily correct. Because, according to him, God's 
power to do all things is limited by the fact that he cannot make 
illogical, impossible events happen. For example, can God 
create square circles, married singles? Can it both exist and not 
exist? Therefore, the power to do anything in the understanding 
of God in theism does not mean that there is no limit in the 
power of God. What is meant here is that there are not illogical 
limits what God can do (Plantinga, 2002; 20; 1967; 120) 
 
According to Plantinga, Mackie's proposition (12), that is to 
say, a good asset is enough to remove the evil, the proposal is 
not necessarily correct. For example, on a winter day, while 
you are sitting in your warm home, and you have spare fuel in 
your car at the door, let's imagine that the car of a friend of 
yours is stranded on the road because the fuel of his car is 
burnup at a distance of 40 km. This is a bad situation for your 
friend. At the same time, it is a bad situation that you can go 
and solve. But you do not do this. That does not mean that you 
are not a good person. Because you don’t know the situation 
that your friend experiences. Therefore, Mackie's proposition 
(12), that is to say, a good asset is enough to remove the evil, 
the proposal is not necessarily correct. Here, Mackie talks 
about the ability of the good to remove the evil, to the extent it 
is good. However, the proposition (12) is by no means 
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compulsory, since it is impossible to resolve an evil that a good 
being could have, as it is in the example. According to 
Plantinga, the proposition that Mackie adds to reveal a formal 
contradiction between the propositions underlying the problem 
of evil should be as following:  
 
An entity who is entirely good removes each evil which he 
knows and he can (Plantinga, 2002; 18; 1967; 118) 
 
In this case, it will be seen that there is no formal contradiction 
between the propositions (9), (10), (11), (13) and (14) which 
form the basis of the problem. If we want to find a formal 
contradiction, it is necessary to add to this group of suggestions 
that God has knowledge of every evil situation. But is not God 
already knowing in the basic understanding of God theism? Is 
not Mackie right in his opinions when we add this to set of 
proposition? 
 
According to Plantinga, the proposition (14) that an entity who 
is entirely good removes each evil which he knows and he can., 
is necessarily not true. For example, as in the example above, 
let's say another friend in the same situation is stranded on the 
wrong side of the road. In this case, you will be able to save 
one of your friend from the bad situation s/he in but you will 
not be able to save the other. Therefore, removing an evil is 
within your power while removing the other is not. However, 
you know both of the situations. It does not mean that you are 
bad because while you save one from the bad situation s/he is 
in and you are not able to save the other, to do more. Therefore, 
the proposition (14) that an entity who is entirely good removes 
each evil which he knows and he can., is necessarily not true 
(Plantinga, 2002; 19). We need another proposition (15) which 
has a fine detail to make this proposition necessarily a correct 
proposition. 
 
An entity who is entirely good removes evil which he knows 
and he can without removing a greater good and causing a 
greater evil (Plantinga, 2002; 20; 1967; 119).  
 
According to Plantinga, even if Mackie adds such a proposal to 
the group of proposals that form the basis of the problem of 
evil, the set of propositions is not a set of contradictive 
propositions. Because this proposition is not completely 
compulsory. For example, let’s suppose that an entity removes 
a bad situation without causing a bigger evil, and without 
destroying a greater good. In this case, it may be the case that 
any entity can find itself in a situation where it can completely 
eliminate any two evils and cannot solve both evils. Imagine 
that you climb into a large mountain on a day when there is a 
violent and dangerous storm, and that two of your mountaineer 
friends are stranded about forty meters below the slope. You 
have the opportunity to rescue only one of the stranded 
mountaineers. If you try to save both of them, the storm is 
going to ruin the whole group. In this case, you can remove an 
evil without causing another evil or removing a greater good. 
However, you can completely remove the other evil. However, 
it is not possible to do both. That you do not save your other 
friend does not show that you're not a good person. Therefore, 
neither the proposition (14) nor the proposition (15) is 
necessarily correct for Plantinga (Plantinga, 2002; 21; 1967; 
120). We would like to point out that this example given by 
Plantinga is not as accurate and prophetic as the statements he's 
made so far in our opinion. Such an example is not appropriate 
for the theism’s understanding of God who is almighty. It is 
quite possible that if an Almighty is capable of removing all 
evil, he can remove both evils that exist at the same time. In 
fact, Plantinga himself is aware of this. However, he tries to 
avoid the situation by stating that this is not the case. 
According to Plantinga, these proposals, which Mackie should 
add in order to reveal that there is a hidden contradiction 
between the basic propositions on which the problem of evil is 
based, are not necessarily correct propositions. What atheist 
theologians who advocate themselves for such contradiction 
should do is to add a necessarily correct proposition. 
 
If we add the proposition;  
(14)  “The Omnipotent who is almighty and Omniscient 
who knows everything entity removes all evil that he can 
remove in a proper manner” 
 
to the set of propositions that form the basis of the problem, 
will any implicit contradiction arise? If we reformulate the 
group of propositions that form the basis of the problem by 
accepting that this proposition is necessarily correct, will there 
be a formal contradiction between the propositions? 
 
1. God is almighty. 
2. God is absolute good. 
3. God knows everything. 
4. There is evil. 
5. The Omnipotent who is almighty and Omniscient who 
knows everything entity removes all evil that he can 
remove in a proper manner. 
6. There is no illogical limit to what an Omnipotent can 
do for all things (Plantinga, 1967; 120). 
 
According to Plantinga, the set of these propositions is also not 
formally contradictory. If there is a formal contradiction 
between them, we need to deduce that any (5) proposition 
rejects (6) the proposition as a result of logic rules with 
reference to the definition of formal contradiction. Or if the set 
of propositions is inconsistent, the proposition (4), there is evil, 
will be rejected by other propositions. That is, the propositions 
(1), (2),(3),(16) and (17) would require the proposition (4), 
There is no evil. However, what the propositions requires 
formally is not that evil does not even exist, but the absence of 
the evil that the God can remove (Plantinga, 2002; 20-21; 
Moore, 1996; 263) 
 
According to Plantinga, we must add the proposition (18), ‘If 
the God is almighty and know everything, he, then, removes all 
evil about the subject in a proper way’, to the set of proposals 
above in order to reveal that there is an implicit contradiction 
among these proposals. In this case, the set of propositions 
including the propositions (16), (17) and (18) is contradictory. 
If (16), (17) and (18) are necessarily correct, there is an implicit 
contradiction between these proposals. Plantinga has already 
stated that the proposals (16) and (17) are necessarily correct. 
Now the question is whether the proposition (18) is necessarily 
correct or not, but according to him, this proposition is not 
correct. Because some good situations cannot exist without 
evil. 
 
Neither one is morally faulty because she has prevented an evil 
which would cause a greater good, nor s/he is morally perfect 
as s/he has allowed a good which would cause a greater evil 
(Plantinga, 1967; 119) 
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According to Plantinga, as the atheist theologians have 
expressed, it is difficult to find the necessarily correct 
propositions that will form a set of propositions formally 
contradictory when added to the set of propositions that 
constitute the basis of evil. These propositions are neither clear 
nor formally contradictory propositions. Perhaps it can be 
suggested that they are implicit contradictory. For this, the 
representatives of the atheistic approach like Mackie need to 
find the necessarily correct propositions that will form a set of 
formally contradictory propositions when added to the set of 
propositions. Such a necessarily proposition was neither put 
forward by Mackie nor by other philosophers advocating the 
atheistic approach. It can be said that the set of these proposals 
are implicitly consistent with reference to the principle ‘It is 
assumed that a proposal is consistent until it is proven to be 
otherwise’, but it cannot be said that it is proven. To do this is 
to find a proposition that is consistent with proposition (1) and 
necessary for proposition (3) among the propositions which 
are the basis of the problem (1) God is almighty, (2) God is 
absolute good and (3) there is evil. Which is; 
 
God crates a world which consists of evil, and there is a good 
reason to do so (Plantinga, 2002; 26). 
In order to defend this view, Plantinga makes the following 
claim: 
 
It is not possible for God to create a world which consists of 
moral good without creating a world which moral evil 
(Plantinga, 1967; 122; Moore, 263). 
 
If the proposition (20) is true, then it is possible that the 
proposition (19), that is, God has a good cause for allowing the 
world to contain evil. There is a good reason that an entity who 
is almighty, knows all things, and is absolutely good allows 
evil as he will not do anything without purpose. The reason is, 
according to Plantinga, the creation of people who are free to 
act. 
 
Well, can we link the evils that exist in the world to the misuse 
of the people’s free will only? For example, how can we 
describe the causes of the evils that are defined as natural evils 
in the history of thought, such as diseases and natural disasters 
which are not even brought into being by the people, are out of 
their own will and neglect and consists of metal pain in both 
humans and animals? Or why has God created people free if 
the reasons of the evil which is suggested by Plantinga that 
God allows evil are the free will which is the cause of the evil 
in this world? Is responsibility a good thing? Moreover, could 
not God create free people who always do what is good? This 
is the last question Mackie asks. According to him; 
 
“…I should ask this: if God has made men such that in their 
free choices they sometimes prefer what is goodandsometimes 
what is evil, why could he not have made men such that they 
always freely choose the good? If there is nologicalim 
possibility in a man's freely choosing the good on one, or on 
several, occasions,there cannot be a logical impossibility in his 
freely choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, 
faced with a choice between making innocent automata and 
making beings who, inacting freely, would sometimes gow 
rong : there was open to him the obviously better possibility of 
making beings who would act freely but always go right. 
Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is 
inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good.  
(Mackie, 1955; 209). 
 
Now, according to Mackie, if God is almighty, knows 
everything and is absolute good, He is able to create certain 
situations that are reasonably possible. It is logically possible 
that all free people do what is good in any case. God can 
always create free people who do good. So, if God can create 
free people who do what is right and if he is absolute good, in 
this case the free people created by God always do the good 
and never do anything that is evil in morals. 
 
According to Plantinga, the idea Mackie expressed that "it is 
logically possible for all people who are free to do what is good 
in any case" is true. However, if the God is almighty, absolute 
good and know everything, there is a problem in the idea that 
'He can create certain situations that are reasonably possible'. 
With reference to the same logic and if we accept the idea that 
the God is almighty as a criterion, it is also reasonably possible 
that God has created people he had not created, which does not 
make any sense. Instead of saying that the Omnipotent creates 
some certain situations which are reasonably possible, we can 
say that the Omnipotent can create any situation which is 
consistent. Even expressed like this, it does not require the 
sentence that God can always create free people who do the 
right thing (Plantinga, 1967; 138; Şimşek, 2014; 424). 
According to Plantinga, a world that is largely full of free 
beings that do good freely more than evil is more valuable than 
a world full of non-free beings on the same terms. God can 
create free creatures. However, he does not only cause them to 
do good. God has to create creatures who can do moral evil to 
create creatures who can do moral good. It is not possible for 
God both to give these creatures the freedom to do evil and to 
prevent them from doing evil. Therefore, God could only 
prevent moral evil to happen by removing the moral good 
(Plantinga, 2002; 30). God can also create free beings that are 
free to do evil but that are merely appreciated causatively to do 
good. But this means that God can create beings that are free to 
do evil, however that are retained to do evil, which is contrary 
to the nature of freedom. When it comes to a world which 
consists of free beings that can be created by God, the fact that 
providing the free beings to do evil cannot be considered within 
the basis of the fact that God is almighty. That a being is free in 
terms of the action A in the time of T can only be possible if 
and only any reasonable law or a by pre-existing condition 
oblige him to do or make him to avoid doing the action A in the 
time of T (Plantinga, 1974; 171). It is then possible to have a 
world that only possesses moral good and no moral evil, but 
whether such a world actually exists is left to the free beings 
that exist in this world (Peterson, 2013; 182) 
 
In our view, Mackie's objection that the creation of innocent 
automats constantly doing good is within the power of God, 
and therefore he must create free people who do good to keep 
moral evil out of sight, is very consistent. Because for God, 
there is no point in creating machines that are programmed to 
live 'virtuous' lives. Human life is only value to the extent that 
s/he can seal his/her own destiny. God has actually given man 
the power to choose between good and evil. When we think 
that God has created automats that choose good constantly, our 
lives will follow a predictable course, and every action will 
follow an initial state set by God. In this case, what would it 
mean to create such a universe? The universe will not be able 
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to do any good; because, it is nothing but the expression of 
God's own goodness. Accordingly, if our choice in the form of 
moral actions and decisions that are not the result of God's 
preprogramming brings any innovation, we must be free in the 
sense that we can choose to do otherwise in the conditions 
we've already done. There is no point in creating human beings 
for God to follow through the God's own way for their choices 
(Poidevin, 148). 
 
In contrast to Mackie, Plantinga believes that it is consistent to 
suggest that an 'almighty, all-knowing and entirely good being' 
will create people who can sometimes do moral evil. According 
to him, that God is almighty, absolute good and knows 
everything does not makes it necessary to create people who 
have moral evil actions. What needs to be done is to show that 
it is consistent that the propositions “God is almighty, absolute 
and an almighty and absolute good entity can create people 
who sometimes conduct moral evil actions” collate, and to find 
a proposition which is logically adequate to reject the 
proposition “God does not create beings who conduct moral 
evil actions.” Plantinga formulates this as following:  
 
God is almighty, absolute good and knows everything.  
God creates free beings.  
 
A truly free being conducts at least one moral evil action.  
God creates beings who conducts moral evil actions (Plantinga, 
1967; s. 12). (from 21 and 22). 
 
According to Plantinga, this evidence is valid evidence. (1), 
(21) and (22) are clearly consistent and the first three 
propositions require the proposition (23). Proposition (23) 
requires the rejection of the proposition "God does not create 
beings who conduct moral evil actions", which shows that the 
proposition “an almighty and absolute good entity can create 
people who sometimes conduct moral evil actions” is 
consistent. (Plantinga, 1967; 140) 
 
The inevitable evil in the world as an indispensable end to the 
fulfillment of a greater good may not contradict with the 
absolute goodness of God. However, another question arises 
here. Is freedom really a good thing? Is it worth to suffer and 
go into too much trouble for just freedom? Or is freedom 
enough for God to allow so much evil? Wouldn't the idea of 
Ivan, the protagonist in the Brothers Karamazov novel "if the 
price of freedom is so heavy, I will return this ticket" be true? 
From this point of view, is it not true that God creates sinless, 
innocent automats that constantly do good in a determination? 
In order to solve the above-mentioned problem, it is necessary 
to determine whether the amount of evil that exists in the world 
is more than goodness. If the existing evil is dominant in the 
world and the goodness is less than the evil, the thoughts 
expressed in this case are justified. According to Plantinga, 
there is no way to measure and determine the amount of moral 
evil. Let's say there is moral evil in the amount of Q in the 
world. In this case, the proposition “God is almighty, absolute 
good and knows everything” is consistent with the proposition 
“God creates some being who conducts moral evil in the 
amount of Q.” We can formulate the proposition as following: 
(1) God is almighty, absolute good and knows everything. 
 
God creates an S bunch consisting of free beings, and moral 
good is relatively more balanced compared to moral good with 
regard to the members of S. 
There is an S bunch consisting of completely free beings, in 
fact, moral good is relatively more balanced compared to moral 
good with regard to the members of S and the members of S1 
conducts moral evil in the amount of Q (Plantinga, 1967;  148). 
 
When we form a set of propositions in this way, the S bunch 
consisting of the free beings is obviously a representation of a 
concrete S1. For this reason, the members of S conduct Q 
moral evil. Therefore, the propositions ‘God is almighty, 
absolute good and knows everything’ (1), ‘God creates an S 
bunch consisting of free beings, and moral good is relatively 
more balanced compared to moral good with regard to the 
members of S’ (24) and ‘there is an S bunch consisting of 
completely free beings, in fact, moral good is relatively more 
balanced compared to moral good with regard to the members 
of S and the members of S1 conducts moral evil in the amount 
of Q’ (25) are not contradictory but consistent with each other. 
Thus, the proposition ‘God is almighty, absolute good and 
knows everything’ is consistent with the proposition ‘God 
creates some free beings which conducts moral evil in the 
amount of Q’, and there is no contradiction between the 
amount of the evil existing in the world and that God is 
almighty, absolute good and knows everything (Plantinga, 
2002; 94). 
 
So far, the evidence suggested by Plantinga to show that the 
evils existing in the world do not contradict with God's 
absolute good and almighty seems to be successful to solve the 
problem that is generally defined as moral evil in the history of 
thought such as war, cruelty, injustice, murder by human being 
who has basically a moral obligation and freedom or which is 
caused a result of abusing his will compared to Mackie. 
Because God created a considerable amount of free human 
beings. Some of them used their freedom in a wrong way. That 
the human beings use their freedom for a wrong cause does not 
constitute a contradictory evidence to God’s absolute goodness 
or almighty. Because God could only prevent the evil arising 
from the free will of human being by cutting back the 
opportunity of moral good (Plantinga, 1974; 165). However, 
another problem which the theist approach should solve is that 
whether the evil, like earthquake, fire, flood disaster, storm, 
famine which is called natural evil and on which human 
beings’ free will has no effect, correspondsto the understanding 
of God described by theism. Actually, this is the subject which 
the theist approach has more difficulty in describing and 
presenting that there is no contradiction against the atheist 
approach. Because the moral evils that arise from the will of 
human beings are easily connected to the freedom given to 
man. But when it comes to evils that do not originate from the 
free will, it becomes different. 
 
According to Plantinga, natural evils such as earthquakes, 
floods, and storms are the result of free acts of free and rational 
but non-human spiritual beings at significant levels or it is 
possible to be like this. In this respect, he links natural evils to 
the freedom of non-human spiritual beings like Satan. 
Therefore, the natural evils for him can be evaluated in the 
category of moral evil from a wider perspective. What is 
important to him is that it is not definitely true but it may be 
true. Such a possibility is enough for him. Therefore;  
 
God creates free non-human beings (spirit, Satan) that do more 
moral good than moral evil. 
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There are beings which are free and non-human and do more 
good than evil.  
 
All of the evil in this world is the result of the free actions of 
the free and non-human beings (Plantinga, 1967; 150). 
 
Plantinga ultimately tries to solve the problem of natural evil 
by assigning freedom to nonhuman beings similarly to the 
proposed solution for moral evil. As a result, he links the cause 
of natural evils to the free will of nonhuman beings. It is not 
within the power of God to create such a world consisting of 
that much of goodness without allowing the free will of these 
beings that allow them to do evil, as it is expressed in the 
problem of moral evil. (Plantinga, 2002; 58) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, which deals with the problem ofevil which is the 
most important problem of the history of thought, we have 
mutually evaluated the thoughts of Plantinga and Mackie who 
we chose as the representatives of theism and atheism. First of 
all, we should state that both philosophers came to a solution or 
presented the problem by addressing it on a mental basis and 
suggesting some reasonable propositions. For Mackie, the 
existence of evil does not match the qualities that theism has 
attributed to God. This is not immediately apparent when 
looking at the set of proposals, but with additional suggestions 
it can be made clear. But according to Plantinga, there is no 
implicit contradiction between these proposals, and there is 
reason why God allows evil. This is the freedom given to man. 
While Plantinga seems justified in the defense of free will, this 
defense may only apply to the solution of moral evils that exist 
in the world. Plantinga does not seem as successful as Mackie, 
especially in the case of earthquakes, floods, storms etc., at 
least in the solution of moral evils. Above all, the fact that 
natural evil is based on the free will of a number of evil spirits 
is not at all successful when it is thought that there is no 
concrete indication or acceptance of such beings. Accepting the 
real existence of evil, which should be done in regard to natural 
evil, is to find a good reason for why God allows evil. We, 
maybe, cannot find the best reason for God to allow evil. 
However, the fact that we do not know this reason doesn't show 
that there is no such thing. This is possible when one considers 
the finite and limited knowledge of man compared to the 
infinite and absolute knowledge of God. However, although 
Plantinga seems unsuccessful in explaining the cause of natural 
evil in solving the problem of evil, it does not justify that 
Mackie concludes the absence of God with reference to this. 
The deduction to make from the propositions that form the 
basis of the problem is not the absence of God, but the inability 
to understand why God allows evil. 
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